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Introduction 
One year ago, I reaffirmed the United States' commitment to water security, 
to ensuring that people have the water they need, when and where they need 
it, in a sustainable manner, while reducing the risk and impact of extreme 
water events like droughts and floods. So water security for us is a matter 
of economic security, human security, and national security, because we see 
potential for increasing unrest, conflicts and instability over water. That is why 
I asked the National Intelligence Council to prepare an intelligence estimate 
on the national security implications of water security up to the year 2040.1 
As the above quote suggests, climate change poses a threat to stability, directly and 
indirectly, from the individual level to the global level. Whether couched as military 
security, national security, international security, or human security, adaptation to the 
destabilizing effects of climate change has mostly presumed the availability of some 
fully functioning, adequately prepared military presence for emergency response or 
policing functions, especially from major world powers such as the United States. 
Military resources and personnel, however, are directly at risk from the effects of 
climate ~hange, and may be at such risk when they are needed the most. Military 
preparedness is undermined by climate change in two particularly critical ways. First, 
catastrophic weather events and sea-level rise pose a direct danger to military facili-
ties, infrastructure, and personnel that are often concentrated on vulnerable coast-
lines. Secondly, the geographical changes brought about by climate change undermine 
established boundaries on land and sea, triggering political tension, confrontations 
over resources, and disruption of political alliances. By way of example for this second 
type of threat, the current crisis over Arctic shipping routes and resources is examined 
in this chapter. Although the threat to military resources and the Arctic crisis are the 
focus of this chapter, the destabilizing effects of climate change on civil society are 
briefly addressed in order to highlight the strategic importance of long-term planning 
The author would like to thank Brendan Clegg, Alexa Roggenkamp, Jillian Jacobs, Derek 
Mathis, and Candace Headen for their contributions to this chapter. 
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to deal with the direct impacts of climate change on military preparedness, in addition 
to dealing with the destabilization climate change threatens. 
Identification of Risks 
The very term "climate change" minimizes the severity and immediacy of the problem, 
by suggesting a more gradual, long-term, generalized change in the climate. A more 
accurate term, particularly in relation to this chapter's topic, would be "climate disrup-
tion." Many kinds of disruption in climate, whether gradual or episodic, or, for that 
matter, beneficial at first look or ultimately detrimental, have some potential to threaten 
political stability due to the disruption of everyday life as expected. Climate disruption 
necessarily threatens human security, leading to instability and requiring a heightened 
level of military preparedness. Climate disruption causes population displacement, relo-
cation, and migration.2 Episodic or gradual increases in water levels require measures to 
protect the coasts,3 and retreat of land use from the coasts,4 as well as intensified levels 
of domestic disaster p~eparedness and response,s or failing that, international prepared-
ness and response. The effects of climate disruption on the energy sector in the United 
States may jeopardize the country's ability to respond to disasters in other nations.6 
Domestic public health and disaster law frameworks do not adequately address the.full 
impact of climate disruption within and outside the United States.? 
A recurrent theme in the chapters addressing the above risks is the current inad-
equacy of the legal regimes to provide sufficiently for these episodic or more long-
term consequences. In both contexts, ad hoc responses often hinge on the military 
preparedness of the victim state or, failing that, the global community. Yet, very lit-
tle attention has been paid to any coordinated efforts by the most powerful state 
actors to prepare jointly for these contingencies. The international and domestic legal 
framework for adaptation seems inadequate8 and underfinanced for the measures 
provided.9 The challenges the United States faces in terms of military preparedness, as 
the most powerful military state in the world, are of strategic importance in confront-
ing the challenges ahead. The increased demand for military preparedness and assis-
tance from U.S. forces due to climate disruption comes at a time when those forces 
may already be overextended, at home and abroad. The United States has not been 
immune to the devastation caused by extreme weather events. Hurricane Katrina, 
flooding along the Mississippi River, and wildfires in the western United States are 
just a few illustrations of the tragedies that can occur as these extreme weather events 
become m.)re prevalent. The diversion of critical military assets for domestic emergen-
cies could inhibit other critical missions.lO 
In addition to increased military engagement in domestic relief, armed conflicts 
such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya necessarily impedes humanitarian calls 
to action overseas.ll Many of the world's developing countries are located in areas of 
the globe most susceptible to the effects of climate change-either low-lying coastal 
areas, presenting storm surge and flooding vulnerabilities, or interior regions prol1e to 
desertification and drought. Deployment of American troops for overseas humanitar-
ian missions could "leave the United States short of troops and equipment precisely 
when extreme weather events will be occurring more frequently at home." 12 Instability 
caused by climate change in politically strategic areas of the world will create addi-
tional pressure on American military forces to respond to and assist fragile govern-
ments, even in the absence of humanitarian disasters,u These scenarios could quickly 
worsen and create situations ripe for exploitation by extremists.14 
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Vulnerability of Military Facilities, Personnel, and Infrastructure 
Alterations in the earth's climate will undoubtedly have a significant impact on mili-
tary strategy, tactics, and planning during the 21st century. This impact will be most 
noticeable as nations confront the variety of climate-based threats endangering the 
physical and political stability of their military facilities worldwide. States have erected 
traditional, defensive-oriented infrastructure designed to protect the borders of their 
hOll}e front and repel foreign invaders. Powerful nations extended facilities outward 
into distant territory, a move fueled by dual, coalescing purposes: (a) to provide an 
extra layer of insulation and early warning against attack; and (b) to allow for quicker 
offensive strike capabilities against far-flung enemies. In the post-World War II era, 
with the advent of new technologies rendering the sea and air primary battlefronts in 
modern warfare, military facilities have proliferated greatly on coastlines and island 
outposts scattered throughout the oceans to advance these dual purposes. 
These various coastline and island bases-which feature, alternatively, facilities 
run by the Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps-face climate-related 
dangers including rising sea levels, flooding, land loss through erosion, storm surges, 
tidal waves, hurricanes, and any combination thereof. As predictions of the likely 
effects of climate change become more dire, it is becoming apparent that the greatest 
threats to these coastal and island stations during the 21st century might come not 
from human enemies but from climate disasters and rising sea levels. In addition, the 
impairment of these military posts could have important downstream consequences 
on a nation's general preparedness for international conflict: the initial blow dealt by 
natural disasters could leave some states extremely vulnerable to subsequent exploi-
tation by predatory neighbors seizing any opportunity for conquest in a world with 
rapidly shrinking stockpiles of resources, or by nons tate actors with disruptive politi-
cal agendas or their own exploitative agendas. 
Instability caused by climate change in politically strategic areas of the world will 
create additional pressure on American military forces to respondY Escalating insta-
bility could present an opening for extremists to exploit the situation.16 Under such 
conditions, any response by the United States would have to be immediate. 
Sea-level rise will undoubtedly have an impact on the security of low-lying Ameri-
can infrastructure. The Department of Defense,'s Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
stated that, as of 2008, the "National Intelligence Council judged that more than 30 
U.S. military installations were already facing elevated levels of risk from rising sea 
levels."17 Naval bases in Norfolk, Virginia, and San Diego, C::tlifornia, are particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of sea-level rise. Through the end of the 2000s, sea level is 
expected to rise anywhere between 1.3 feet and 6.6 feet, but most likely around 2.6 
feet. 18 Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard bases will also be affected by 
climate change. Bases in every branch of the military have diminished, both in num-
ber and extent.19 It is therefore necessary to ensure that the military installations that 
remain are maintained at the highest standards of protection.20 
Just as domestic military installations will confront the challenges of climate dis-
ruption, American infrastructure will also be vulnerable to storm surges and sea-level 
rise internationally. In fact, these overseas facilities may be at greater risk. Many of 
the dangers faced by coastal facilities-whether on the home front or on strategi-
cally located island outposts-overlap considerably. The most prominent threat fac-
ing such facilities comes from the rise of existing sea levels. As discussed previously, 
conservative estimates of the likely measurement of sea-level rise by the end of the 
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century hover around 1.3 feet;21 more dire predictions lie at about 6.6 feet.22 A rise 
in sea level of the magnitude anticipated could put entire existing port facilities lit-
erally underwater. Military officials will face excruciating decisions, constrained by 
tightening national budgets and geographic and political realities, to either abandon 
existing facilities or attempt to move them inland in the many instances when fortifi-
catipn against the sea is at best only a temporary solution; as the distances from the 
coast lengthen, the costs of such a monumental move will inevitably skyrocket. As 
the United States military, and the Navy in particular, prepare for climate change, the 
construction of new bases to replace those susceptible to sea-level rise and extreme 
weather events has been considered.23 Navy leadership is not only contemplating the 
addition of traditional naval bases, but also offshore "sea basing" platforms,24 These 
sea bases could provide economically efficient and politically neutral alternatives to 
more traditional bases that require heavy investment and host country consent.25 
Some military infrastructure, especially naval docks and piers, simply cannot be 
moved and replaced on firm ground until a constant coastline has solidified. The cost 
implications for major continental, low-lying naval hubs, such as those mentioned 
previously in Norfolk, Virginia, or San Diego, California, could be staggering, due to 
the sheer number and size of the structures immediately adjacent to the coast.26 
Commanders of bases situated on island outposts face a similar quandary as those 
stationed on the continents: which facilities should be saved, which can be moved, 
and which must be abandoned out of logistical or financial necessity? Some islands, 
however, face an even more pressing possibility from rising sea levels: annihilation 
from the map. Military officials have already highlighted Diego Garcia, an island atoll 
in the Indian Ocean, as a likely candidate for near or complete disappearance due to 
rising sea levelsP Diego Garcia, which sits perilously on an outcrop only a few feet 
above sea level, serves as a logistics hub for both American and British military outfits 
in the Middle East; it plays an important role in continued operations against coali-
tion enemies in the war on terror. As sea levels rise, the island hub may be drowned 
completely, forcing those stationed at Diego Garcia to search for a substitute location 
that will almost certainly lack the combination of proximity and security that Diego 
Garcia possesses. Low-lying Pacific islands, including Guam, could face similar issues 
and require a comparable plan for substitution.28 
The slow trudge of the rising sea toward the eventual drowning out of some 
coastal facilities is accompanied by two concomitant threats stemming from these 
higher ocean levels: flooding and land loss through erosion.29 While a steady increase 
in rising sea levels can be dealt with through advance planning and erecting coastal 
barriers or reconstructing facilities at sufficient distances from low-lying coasts, sud-
den or sustained floods could knock out vital infrastructure before a backup plan has 
been implemented. Some of the "most vulnerable regions in the world to sea level rise" 
are located in Asia, especially those nations on both the subcontinent and in Southeast 
Asia, including India, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia.30 The persistent 
presence of ocean water, even if not permanent, can contribute slowly to land ero-
sion.31 This slow elimination of land through erosion, when combined with the steady 
sea-level rise, will hasten the need to move military installations inland in an effort 
to avoid being swallowed by the sea. Inland flooding can also result from a marked 
increase in storm surges, with the same disastrous effects as those caused by flooding 
from sea-level rise. In combination with a higher average sea level, future storm surges 
could "enable inundation and damaging waves to penetrate further inland, increasing 
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flooding, erosion, and the subsequent detrimental impacts on built infrastructure and 
natural ecosystems."32 Lind along rivers that are connected to the oceans is also at risk 
of loss because increased sea level could also mean increased river levels. This land-
like that along the Niger, Mekong, Yangtze, Ganges, Nile, Rhine, and Mississippi riv-
ers-is often characterized by high population densities and economic development.33 
A single storm that causes significant flooding of these lands could have devastating 
effects on the directly affected areas in addition to other regions that depend on them. 
As global temperatures rise, so too will the risk of wildfires.34 These fires pose 
serious threats to military installations throughout the interior of the United States. 
This danger also extends to military training facilities that are usually found in arid 
parts of the country meant to mimic potential combat zones. 
At present, the correlation between rising temperatures and the increased quan-
tity, and intensity, of various kinds of storms is still subject to spirited debate.35 These 
include storm surges, hurricanes, cyclones, tornadoes, and other tropical storms. The 
combination of such storms with the rising of sea levels, which is more conclusively 
presumed as inevitable, is dire; moreover, the intertwined effect of more intense storms 
and higher water levels would wreak havoc on coastal facilities worldwide.36 The 
National Resource Council observed that "[s]torm surges occurring on higher mean 
sea levels will enable inundation and damaging waves to penetrate further inland, 
increasing flooding, erosion, and the subsequent detrimental impacts on built infra-
structure."37 In recent years, the catastrophic impact of such violent storms is readily 
evident: Hurricane Andrew in 2002 ravaged an air force base in Florida that was 
never reopened; Hurricane Ivan in 2004 knocked a naval air station, also in Florida, 
out of commission for an entire year.38 Although not directly affecting major U.S. 
military facilities, the widespread destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina on the 
entire city of New Orleans is well-documented.39 Coastlines are ~home to approxi-
mately two-thirds of the world's population.40 Changes in sea level will necessitate 
humanitarian assistance. The limits of the United States' resources along with the 
political importance of stability will force difficult decisions about when and to what 
extent the country will respond to those calls, in terms of resource allocation, strategic 
importance, and nonclimate disruption demands on the military. 
The management and coordination of modern war depends on far more than 
the decisions made by military brass at the command centers, operations hubs, and 
military installations discussed above. The seamless functioning of the leadership hier-
archy at these bases often depends on a whole host of elements similarly running 
smoothly. Dubbed "critically important facilities and infrastructure" by nonprofit 
research institute CNA Corporation (CNA), these elements include routes and meth-
ods of transportation, heavy industry and production centers, port and docking facili-
ties, and energy production and distribution stations.41 For example, CNA observed 
that the Department of Defense is "almost completely dependent on electricity from 
the national grid to power critical missions at fixed installations."42 Like military 
installations, the "critically important facilities and infrastructure" are often near the 
coast; they are also subject to rising sea levels, storm surges, flooding, and extreme 
weather events capable of either slowly drowning them out or destroying them in 
a single strike. Destruction of this support infrastructure could effectively cripple 
an entire base while leaving it physically untouched; in today's world, such a facil-
ity could hardly function without available transportation routes, sustained power, 
Internet access, and constant provision of essential supplies. Therefore, the complex 
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decisions regarding which facilities to move-and how to implement such a plan-are 
only made more intricate when injected with considerations relating to essential aux-
iliary infrastructure.43 The estimated costs of preparing these structures for the poten-
tial effects of climate change are steep and wide-ranging-somewhere between $5 
billion and $295 billion per year for five years.44 While these numbers seem daunting, 
all the potential damages caused by severe weather events could add up to much more. 
In the end, climate proofing may be the more cost-effective alternative. There are 
immediate operational costs as well. Currently, to insulate military assets from storm 
damage, aircraft are moved inward and ships leave port as hurricanes approach.45 
This movement increases operational costs for military installations, particularly on 
the eastern seaboard. Moreover, this migration inhibits military readiness for disaster 
response and other future missions. 
A foretaste of the devastation that can befall a nation from extreme weather condi-
tions is the catastrophe that hit Japan in March 2011. An earthquake that triggered a 
subsequent tsunami ravaged the Japanese archipelago, causing immeasurable physical, 
economic, and emotional damage. The previously unimaginable combination of a 9.0 
earthquake and tsunami precipitated the worst nuclear emergency since Chernobyl at 
the Fukushima Daiichi power station.46 An overheated nuclear reactor core, unable to 
cool due to the loss of power to backup cooling systems, threatened to expose the island 
nation and possibly more distant locations to large amounts of radiationY 
As witnessed in Japan, the human security risks present from a nuclear meltdown 
are staggering; large-scale nuclear disaster caused by climate catastrophes (however 
unlikely) could threaten entire regions of the United States and call for long-term, or 
even permanent, evacuation of contaminated areas. Proximity of nuclear facilities to 
other military installations would, of course, present an additional risk to those facili-
ties that also stems directly from the consequences of climate disaster. Approximately 
two dozen nuclear facilities and refineries are situated near the American coastline 
and are at risk of severe storm damage.48 
As with all events that have implications for the military, an examination of the 
immediate effects is too narrow a lens with which to evaluate the range of potential 
consequences. Any military resources funneled into efforts to prevent, adapt to, or 
recover from the calamities of climate change are necessarily diverted from other 
. pressing military obligations. The downstream effects of preparing for the ramifica-
tions of climate change are therefore readily apparent: forces that are sent to rebuild 
damaged infrastructure cannot be quickly deployed anywhere else, and troops and 
equipment removed from vulnerable positions are out of position and likely incapable 
of rapid mobilization. The problems posed by climate disaster as related to martial 
preparedness are therefore twofold: military units can be thousands of miles away, 
occupied by complex international relief efforts; or they can simply be removed from 
their home dock or airfield, and unable to respond immediately to rapid attacks.49 
A more searching inquiry into the first problem reveals· several issues beyond the 
practical difficulties of stationing troops far overseas. While on recovery missions in 
foreign lands recently devastated by a climate catastrophe, troops are left vulnerable 
to residual weather conditions. More importantly, they may be placed in hostile envi-
ronments teeming with disrupted local populations, who are cast into desperate situ-
ations following a sudden upheaval and seeking to establish-or re-establish-their 
power base. As discussed above, some of these locations are likely hotbeds for radi-
calism and terrorism.50 Parallels may be drawn to the outbreaks of terrorist activity 
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conducted by radical extremists after American military missions began in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during the first decade of the 2000S.51 
The second problem related to military readiness posed by climate disaster is more 
straightforward: without equipment and troops standing at the ready, operating the sta-
tions on the home front, countries will be vulnerable to well-timed, opportunistic attacks 
by their enemies. The evacuation of necessary personnel from coastal regions, in anticipa-
tion of impending storms or floods, leaves these areas exposed. It is easy to envision the 
effects of attacks directed at unprotected facilities and installations that lack the person-
~el to operate coastal defenses or anti-aircraft batteries. As can be seen from these two 
scenarios, the prospect of monumental, violent storms-both abroad and at home-
drastically reduces the ability of military forces to respond to threats and positions them 
in vulnerable situations in an increasingly destabilizing international environment. These 
problems are only amplified if forward bases-such as those on mid-ocean islands-are 
lost, greatly reducing the ability of the military to respond to crises in vital areas. 
In addition to the potential effects of inundation on military installations, climate 
change will affect military readiness in other ways. Severe weather could make ship 
and aircraft operations more difficult, creating a distraction from the main mission.52 
Catastrophic or extreme weather events pose a danger not only to expensive military 
assets like aircraft and ships, but also to servicemen and servicewomen. 
The prospect of these convergent scenarios demands that military planners begin 
to incorporate measures to respond to climate change disaster into their worldwide 
strategy-and operating budgets. To avoid calamity, military leaders must design, ex 
ante, blueprints for facing a situation where advance outposts have been destroyed and 
troops are scattered around the globe. This advance planning can be exercised both in 
the renovation of existing bases and in the construction of new bases: "[p]lanning and 
action can make these installations more resilient. Lack of planning can compromise 
them or cause them to be inundated, compromising military readiness and capability."53 
For those facilities already constructed, this process would involve either the fortifica-
tion of existing infrastructure in an attempt to "climate-proof" the buildings, supporting 
power supplies, and routes of access-or a reinstallation of the infrastructure further 
from the coast. For new facilities designed to replace bases like Diego Garcia, considered 
to be fatally susceptible to the effects of climate change, this would be a very drawn-
out operation. It would require long-term forecasting of likely weather effects on areas 
around the globe, and could involve coordination with foreign nations if proposed bases 
impinge on their sovereign territory.54 The construction of military bases-or even the 
negotiations surrounding such planned construction-could potentially upset delicate 
balances in international politics, driving states away from symbiotic relationships and 
toward the brink of conflict. From this brief discussion, one can observe that any long-
term strategy to cope with the dangers from climate disaster carries with it many poten-
tial peripheral snares. The response of nations to the threats to their military facilities 
posed by climate change will therefore playa very important role in the evolution of 
international relations during the upcoming century. 
The Arctic-A'Special Case 
Emerging Security Issues 
The once impassable Arctic Ocean seaways are opening up to maritime traffic. Rising 
global temperatures have led to a reduction of ice surface in the Arctic Ocean.55 The 
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trend in warming temperatures is expected to continue, leading to more and more sea-
sonal losses of ice cover. Scientific estimates vary as to the possibility and timing of an 
ice-free Arctic Ocean. Some predict ice-free waters as early as summer 2013, while oth-
ers postpone this occurrence until 2030.56 Scientists have noticed that the ice packs melt 
earlier in the year, and it takes longer to refreeze, leading some analysts to conclude that 
an ice-free Arctic Ocean is no longer a question of ifbut a question of when.57 
Commercial maritime activity has already increased with the loss of the ice. The 
once-mythic Northwest Passage, which primarily runs through Canada, has opened 
for maritime traffic for the past three years.58 A bulk container vessel utilized the 
Northern Route, primarily bordering Russia, to ship iron ore from Norway to China 
in the summer of 2010.59 Now, shipping companies are eyeing the Arctic Ocean for 
possible shipping lanes.6o In fact, commercial maritime activity in the Arctic Ocean 
seaways increased fivefold in summer 2011.61 
The increase in commercial activity has led to a host of complex international 
problems. In the past, the thick ice sheets and the impassability of the now-open sea 
lanes negated the need to delineate control of the region. Now that commercial ves-
sels can enter these sea lanes, warships cannot be far behind. Lee Willett, the head of 
the maritime studies program at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based 
military think tank, stated that warships will enter the Arctic Ocean in order to defend 
claims on natural resources in the area: "Having lots of warships, from lots of nations 
who have lots of competing claims on territory-that may lend itself to a rather tense 
situation."62 The increase in all kinds of shipping and the newfound access to a pleth-
ora of natural resources present a host of international issues in an area where histori-
cally there has not been much control. 
Governments are just beginning to evaluate the nature of the difficulties posed by 
a navigable Arctic region and to account for them in future strategic outlooks. The 
situation creates a whole host of complex international problems because the pres-
ence of the thick ice sheets previously negated the need to delineate, specifically, which 
territory was under whose control. The issues related to territorial possession will 
determine which nations reap the rewards from increased access to shipping, includ-
ing all tangential associated benefits of such control; just as importantly, these issues 
will determine which nations can search for, harvest, and exploit the vast resources in 
the Arctic Sea itself and underneath the expansive seabed. At present, there are more 
questions than answers for how these issues will play out in the near future. This 
chapter therefore serves to identify the most likely problems that will arise and to 
identify those mechanisms-already in existence or capable of future adoption-that 
can allow positive international cooperation in the region and prevent armed conflict. 
As mentioned above, the melting Arctic ice shelf will open up two shipping routes 
that have previously been closed off because, even with the advent of modern sea-
based icebreakers, the density of the packed ice rendered maneuvering the waters 
either exceedingly dangerous or downright impossible. The so-called "Northwest Pas-
sage" runs primarily along the Canadian border and is the path through the Western 
Hemisphere that would unite the eastern seaboard of North America with East Asia 
and the Pacific Ocean. In the Eastern Hemisphere, the "Northern Route" meanders 
along the Russian border and brings together East Asia and Western Europe, provid-
ing entry into the Atlantic Ocean. Access to either of these routes would greatly reduce 
the length of sea-based trips from Europe to the Pacific (by avoiding the Suez Canal) 
and from Europe to the Pacific (by avoiding the Panama Canal). Moreover, the Arctic 
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routes are in close geographic proximity to some of the world's largest economies, 
each heavily dependent on foreign trade; this list includes the United States, Russia, 
China, the European Union, Canada, and Japan. These nations would presumably 
find great advantages in using these sea-based travel lanes for importing and export-
ing goods. In addition to shortening the length of time-providing significant energy 
and cost savings-these routes allow trading nations to avoid those areas, especially 
in the Middle East and off the Horn of Africa, that in recent times have been plagued 
by terrorist activity and rogue pirate outfits. In sum, the presence of Arctic sea lanes 
could steer the world into a new phase of globalization: if developed fully, global trade 
patterns could be completely and irrevocably altered.63 
The melting of the Arctic Ocean sea lanes would not only aid commercial shipping 
but would also open up the area for the harvesting of natural resources. "Although 
the precise extent of the region's undiscovered oil and natural gas reserves and vari-
ous minerals has not been determined, indications are that it is massive."64 The race 
to claim these resources could lead to international problems in an area where there 
has not been much control. For example, in 2007 Russia sent a nuclear-powered ice-
breaker and two deep-water submarines to plant a Russian flag in the seabed beneath 
the North Pole. Canada is constructing several new Arctic patrol vessels, a deep-water 
port, and a training facility in the Northwest Passage. Several other countries, notably 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, have also made claims on the natu-
ral resources of the area.65 
Currently, there are few international binding rules that govern the Arctic region. 
Historically, the thick ice made rules unnecessary, as the region was accessible only 
to explorers and adventure-seekers. The presence of commercial vessels and the pos-
sible exploitation of natural resources present a potentially tense situation. The areas 
most under contention are the high seas and the various nations' continental shelves. 
There is an international organization devoted to resolving Arctic issues-the Arctic 
Council. Ostensibly, one of the goals of the Council is to promote the responsible use 
of Arctic natural resources, but it remains to be seen, as discussed below, how effective 
the Council will be in resolving the myriad of complex issues presented by the loss of 
the Arctic ice. 
Several nations have already stated an "interest" in the Arctic. The industrial 
nations of China, South Korea, Japan, Iceland, Norway, and Russia, as well as the 
European Union, have declared interests in the development of the region. Developing 
nations, too, like Brazil, India, and South Africa, have also declared an interest in the 
region. Several of these nations do not border the Arctic Ocean. 
One potential solution for resolving Arctic claims issues is to restrict access to the 
region, but doing so would necessarily defy the general right of free navigation on the 
seas. There are several methods by which nations could control and/or restrict access 
to the Arctic. One method would be to charge tolls to enter the area. Of course, that 
would involve a determination of which nations or international bodies should be 
the controlling entities. Another method would be to blockade the Arctic sea lanes. 
Finally, there could be restricted access based on ship performance and standards. 
Maritime classification societies already classify some vessels as capable of operating 
in icy waters. Thus, it would be a fairly easy process to restrict access to only those 
vessels capable of operating in those waters. 
Of course, these methods all seem to impede the free navigation of the seas, a right 
granted by the Law of the Sea Convention.66 Would there be remedies available for 
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unfair blockage of the Arctic Ocean? The Convention grants authority to an Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. What role would this court play in settling the 
disputes concerning the Arctic Ocean? Will the United States, which is not currently a 
signatory to the Law of the Sea Convention, play any role in this resolution? 
Should access to the Arctic Ocean be restricted based on some criteria, would 
humanitarian aid vessels be allowed passage, regardless of flag state? One would 
expect an exception for aid vessels in providing humanitarian relief to disaster areas. 
But what if the controlling entity of the Arctic Ocean does not provide for such an 
exception? Would there be any resolution of this potentially thorny issue? The United 
States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps both provide humanitarian relief 
efforts around the globe. The National Research Council concluded that hospital 
ships for humanitarian relief efforts may be in higher demand as the Arctic ice recedes. 
With the opening of the Arctic sea lanes, it may become faster and easier to send relief 
efforts, thus leading to a higher demand for United States humanitarian aid.67 
If access to the Arctic Ocean is restricted, what entity will enforce the restrictions? 
The United Nations? NATO? The Arctic Council? A coalition of controlling nations? 
How effective would the restrictions and the enforcement be? 
Of all of the nations with a declared "interest" in the Arctic, Russia's role pres-
ents some of the most challenging questions. Former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
called for international cooperation and environmental protection in the Arctic.68 Yet, 
Russia has also been the most aggressive in claiming rights in the region for itself. In 
addition to planting a Russian flag on the sea floor beneath the North Pole,69 Rus-
sia has also claimed the Lomonosov Ridge, supposedly an underwater extension of 
Siberia. Analysts determined that Russia's claim on this territory would add 1.2 mil-
lion square kilometers to its control, as well as an estimated 10 billion metric tons of 
hydrocarbons.70 
Russia has also provoked other nations with its Arctic claims, including the United 
States, by drafting laws that seem to reflect Russia's Arctic claims. Russia's Foreign 
Ministry has claimed that the laws "would apply only to administrative borders inside 
Russia, and [are] not connected to its claim for a greater share of the Arctic."71 The 
Russian Federation attempted to reassure other nations by stating that they would 
work with a UN committee concerning the Arctic claims.72 Nevertheless, the Russian 
Navy currently has the largest fleet of icebreakers, and it is currently working on a $7 
billion expansion of the port in Murmansk.73 
The Arctic waters are already contested by competing nations. As the ice recedes, 
and vessel traffic increases, tensions will only multiply. Russia and Canada have already 
traded verbal shots across the bow,?4 The other nations with interests in the region, 
notably the United States, Norway, Denmark, and Finland, have also announced plans 
to beef up their military forces in the region.75 _ 
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention will be critical in resolving these issues, but 
the United States is not a party to it, despite recent efforts to· push ratification through 
the Senate.76 The Department of Defense (DoD) supports ratification to the Conven-
tion.?? In its review of the effects of climate change on the USN, the National Research 
Council determined that remaining outside of the Convention would hinder the USN's 
ability to meet the country's goals in the Arctic region. Thus, it, too, recommended 
that the United States ratify the Convention.78 
Scientists predict that the natural resource reserves of the Arctic region are 
immense. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that some 400 oil and natural gas 
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fields north of the Arctic Circle hold as much as 90 billion barrels worth of oil and 
1,670 trillion cubic feet of gas,?9 If nations begin to develop the Arctic resources and 
utilize the Arctic sea lanes, then what will happen to the Suez Canal and the Middle 
East? To what extent will Arctic oil help the United States to escape a dependency on 
Middle Eastern oil reserves? 
Another potential problem with developing the Arctic region concerns the rights 
of indigenous people. The Arctic Council does have provisions for recognizing indig-
enous populations and allowing their representatives to be permanent participants,80 
butas discussed below, they have no voting rights in the Council. It remains to be seen 
wheth~r these permanent participants and the Arctic Council can adequately respect 
and protect the indigenous peoples and the fragile Arctic environment while other 
nations harvest the natural resources of the region. 
With so many states declaring an interest in the Arctic and so few rules control-
ling the region, what environmental laws and policies would govern, in overlapping 
jurisdictions? As previously mentioned, the potential oil and natural gas reserves of 
the Arctic region are quite large.81 Countries that border the Arctic clearly have an 
interest in claiming these resources and potentially have more of a legitimate claim 
than countries that do not border the Arctic. The expansive definition of a coastal 
state's continental shelf under the 1982 Convention, where most of these resources 
are located, is yet another reason why the United States stands to benefit from ratifi-
cation.82 It has been estimated that the United States could claim the continental shelf 
under the treaty as far as 600 miles beyond its exclusive economic zone as the ice 
cap recedes in the Arctic.83 In addition to oil and gas, there are also potentially large 
quantities of other minerals, including gold, copper, iron ore, cobalt, nickel, diamonds, 
and manganese.84 
With the region opening to commercial and military traffic, cruise lines would 
probably not be far behind. In fact, Russia is already outfitting some of its icebreak-
ers with accommodations for touristS.85 What impact will tourism have on the region 
and the indigenous population? Nations and private commercial parties would also 
be competing for fishing rights in the Arctic. Would this competition deprive the Arc-
tic indigenous peoples of their livelihoods?86 There are also environmental concerns. 
How will the influx of warmer water affect the indigenous wildlife? Will southern 
marine species come to dominate the Arctic? 
Nation-states and private commercial entities seeking to compete for these 
resources will be driven to develop the infrastructure to extract the resources of the 
region. Oil and natural gas rigs, pipelines, support facilities, and collection facilities 
will need to be built. The personnel will need housing; ports will need to be developed 
to accommodate this work. The Arctic region may not be able to support all this infra-
structure in an environmentally sound manner. 
With so much commercial value in the area, nations are likely to send military 
vessels into the region to protect their claimsP This would necessitate the deployment 
of military technology that can operate in the polar climate.88 Currently, the United 
States is ill-equipped to protect its interests in the region: "[T]he Coast Guard has just 
three polar icebreakers in its fleet-the only such vessels in the entire U.S. military."89 
Additionally, two of those vessels are over 30 years old, and one of those is cur-
rently in caretaker status in Seattle in need of extensive repairs.90 Russia, on the other 
hand, has 18 heavy icebreakers, and Canada possesses six.91 Military tensions have 
increased in the region as nations rush to claim the Arctic and defend those claims.92 
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States are already engaging in increased military activity in the Arctic region. In 
2010, Canada purchased fleets of F-35 jet fighters and began construction of a new 
base on its Arctic coast.93 Military activity to control the Arctic will probably revolve 
around naval forces, but air support and missile defense systems will also be criti-
cal. As previously mentioned, the United States is currently woefully unprepared to 
grapple with an increased military role in the Arctic, despite the Obama administra-
tion's designation of the region as one of key strategic interest.94 NATO has already 
completed war games in the Arctic to devise military strategies for the region.95 
The increased military activity in the Arctic will affect more than just the coun-
tries directly involved. For example, Iceland's former Prime Minister Geir Haarde 
pleaded in 2010 with the competing nations to draw down their military presence in 
the Arctic: "The end of the Cold War resulted in a marked reduction in military activ-
ity in the High North-Iceland would like it to stay that way."96 Clearly, the bordering 
nations with claims on the region will be affected by climate change and the race for 
resources. Even nations that do not directly border the Arctic will face repercussions 
from events in the region. 
At a 2009 conference in Iceland to plan for climate change in the Arctic, NATO 
released a statement calling for a military presence in the region.97 As then-NATO 
Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told reporters, "I would be the last one 
to expect a military conflict-but there will be a military presence."98 Nations and 
military analysts have already recognized that climate change could lead to military 
tensions in the region. For example, the United States National Academy of Sciences 
has determined that climate change will lead to new challenges for the USN, United 
States Coast Guard (USCG), and USMC in the region.99 
If the United States wants to take on an expanded military role in the Arctic, then 
the nation's military faces significant challenges. First, if the United States focuses on 
the Arctic as an area of strategic interest, as the Obama administration has recom-
mended,l0o then other regions might have to be drawn down. Second, a military role 
in the Arctic would require significant spending to develop and construct military 
hardware capable of operating in the Arctic, as well as for training troops and build-
ing the logistical support for those operations. 
The next question would be which branch assumes primary control. The Penta-
gon has unified Arctic responsibility under one command.101 In the face of budgetary 
shortages, the USCG in 2011 decided to decommission one of its icebreakers in order 
to obtain the money to repair another: "'As old as they are, and with what it costs 
to maintain and keep them up, we had to make some difficult choices,' said a Coast 
Guard spokesman, Lt. Paul Rhynard. 'With the funding we were given to fix them 
both, we could only effectively fix one."'102 
The United States may already be falling behind in the competition over the:: Arc-
tic. The DoD recognizes that it must work with the Coast Guard and Department 
of Homeland Security "to address gaps in Arctic communications, domain aware-
ness, search and rescue, and environmental observation and forecasting capabilities 
to support both current and future planning and operations."103 The USN probably 
does not currently have the capability to operate in the Arctic: "[T]he U.S. Navy has 
had a very limited surface ship presence in ... cold-weather conditions ... the U.S. 
military as a whole has. lost most of its competence in cold-weather operations for 
high-Arctic warfare."104 Military vessels will be needed to defend any claims on the 
region. Additionally, military vessels could protect American commercial operations 
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and investigatory teams. lOS However, the increased number of military vessels in the 
Arctic has the potential to cause more tension, leading to possible conflicts. 
In addition to protecting American interests in the Arctic, the military would also 
need to be concerned with an expanded role in search-and-rescue and other emer-
gency operations. If the USN and USCG undertake any emergency operations in the 
Arctic, they would have to develop specialized search-and-rescue operations designed 
for the region. The remote locations, the freezing conditions, and the lack of logisti-
cal support make emergency operations in the Arctic uniquely different from routine 
operations in warmer waters. 
pespite competing claims to the Arctic's natural resources, there is also an aware-
ness of the need to protect the fragile Arctic ecosystem.I06 Monitoring and protecting 
the environment present many of the same difficulties as determining how to control 
access to the region. Who is responsible for monitoring and protecting the Arctic? In 
the event of an environmental disaster, such as an oil spill, who will clean it up? In 
addition to the allocation of responsibility and costs, there is the added degree of dif-
ficulty in cleaning up a disaster in such a remote location. 
Utilizing the Arctic sea lanes also presents unique environmental issues. The 
shorter Arctic sea passages would reduce greenhouse gas emissions globally, at least 
from the shipping sector. The Arctic sea passages are shorter than the Suez or Panama 
canals, but they would put more air pollutants (especially black carbon) into the Arc-
tic's air, which may lead to more ice melting. Commercial activity in the region would 
also pose environmental risks: "Such increased shipping, mining, and drilling would 
almost certainly pose new environmental risks."lo7 
As the branches of the United States military begin to plan for the future of the 
region, they must consider the potential effects of climate change to ensure that the 
military installations of tomorrow are effectively adapted to withstand the associated 
risks. The Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review Report called for "a 
comprehensive assessment of all installations to assess the potential impacts of climate 
change on its missions and adapt as required."lo8 As stated in the CNA's report, "plan-
ning and action can make these installations more resilient. Lack of planning can 
compromise them, or cause them to be inundated, compromising military readiness 
and capability."109 
International Mechanisms for the Arctic 
In view of the challenges just described, a major question concerns the nature and 
extent of the role to be played by the Arctic Council. The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 
established the Arctic Council.110 It was created to facilitate the Arctic states' coopera-
tion with each other and with the Arctic inhabitants and indigenous communities.111 
The Council seeks to promote "sustainable development" and "environmental pro-
tection in the Arctic,"112 and to control pollution and environmental damage in the 
Arctic. l13 Additionally, the Council is committed to maintaining the well-being of the 
indigenous people.114 
The council is composed of member states, permanent participants, and observ-
ers. llS Member states are states that border the Arctic.116 Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States are the eight 
member states. l17 Permanent participants are Arctic organizations, with primarily 
Arctic indigenous constituents, which represent "a single Indigenous people resident 
in more than one Arctic State" or "more than one Arctic Indigenous people resident 
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in a single Arctic State."118 There are currently six permanent participants: the Aleut 
International Association (AlA), Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich'in Council 
International (GCI), Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), Saami Council, and Russian 
Arctic Indigenous People of the North (RAIPON).119 Non-Arctic states, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations can be observers,12o As of June 
2012, there were 26 observers.121 
The Arctic Council has no legal personality.122 The Council works together to cre-
ate goals and obligations that will promote. environmental protection and sustainable 
development in the Arctic.123 The obligations, however, are not legally enforceable-
they are merely recommendations.124 The Arctic Council has traditionally been con-
sidered without the ability to impose binding legal obligations even upon its member 
states and with all recommendations made by consensus of the member states only.125 
Each member state chairs the council for two years.126 After two years, the chair-
manship rotates to a new country.127 The chair state determines the goals for its term 
and how it would like to achieve them.128 It has appeared to be more difficult to 
achieve even the limited goals of the Council because of the rotating chairmanship.129 
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden have recognized that problem and have created a 
plan together in order to ensure that they have a little over six years, 2006-2013, to 
achieve their common goals.130 
The Council holds ministerial meetings biannually.131 The country holding the 
chairmanship hosts the Council.132 At the meetings, the Council decides what pro-
grams and projects to implement.133 The eight member states have voting power and 
the permanent participants are consultants.134 
The ministerial declarations are given to the Council's working groups,135 which 
are responsible for implementing the programs and projects.136 There are six working 
groups,137 each of which has its own board and secretariat.138 The boards are gener-
ally composed of representatives from member states and permanent participants.139 
Working groups hold regular meetings.14o Experts are frequently invited to attend 
and offer advice.141 Observers are also welcome to attend the meetings and partici-
pate in projects.142 
The maneuvering for Arctic resources may benefit, among others, Greenland and 
Quebec. Stronger financial footing for both may also lead to intensified secession 
claims, particularly in Greenland to the dismay of Denmark, which otherwise has no 
share in these resources. Two of the eight member states, Canada and the Russian 
Federation, have been particularly aggressive in staking their claims, with the Russian 
Federation, as noted above, going so far as to plant its flag in the seabed under the 
North Pole and patrol the area with bomber planes and warships.143 
The May 2011 meeting of the Council resulted in two minor agreements on oil 
spills and search-and-rescue operations, more significant for what they represented 
than for what they accomplished. The search-and-rescue agreement was the-first 
legally binding agreement negotiated within the Council. The agreements suggest that 
the Council has recognized the power it may exercise over one-quarter of the world's 
untapped oil and gas reserves, along with other mineral resources, by entering into 
the first stages of binding rules and/or agreements. The significance of this step was 
marked by the presence of Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton at the May 2011 meet-
ing, the first time a Council meeting was attended by a U.S. secretary of state.144 Just 
as significantly, the efforts of ad-hoc observer states (China, the EU, Italy, Japan, and 
South Korea) to become permanent observers were resisted by Russia and indigenous 
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groups threatened by the prospect of such powerful non-Arctic states having even a 
nonvoting role in the Council.145 
The United States' failure to ratify the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea is a decision that can no longer be overlooked for its consequences for the interna-
tional community, but even more for the United States. The United States has for many 
years recognized the essential provisions of the treaty, including the most basic provi-
sions regarding delineation of the territorial sea, contiguous zone, economic zone, and 
high seas. The 1982 treaty increases the security authority of states in some of these 
zones, and expands coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The United 
States, disproportionately with respect to most states, benefits from these provisions. 
As a nonparty the United States is precluded from representation on the international 
bodies created by the nearly universally adopted treaty. The Obama administration, 
and for some time the Department of Defense, have supported ratification of the 
treaty. The "sea change," as it were, in support for ratification is that its traditional 
opponents are now urging ratification in response to the Arctic crisis. On June 21, 
2011, at a symposium on the impacts of an ice-diminishing Arctic on naval and mari-
time operations, both the Republican and Democrat senators from Alaska called for 
immediate ratification of the treaty.146 In the opinion of this author, it is critical that 
the United States ratify the treaty, and playa proactive, high-level role in the previ-
ously ignored Arctic Council. 
International Mechanisms, Climate Change, 
and National Security 
On a more general normative level, in the author's view, the refusal of the United 
Nations to recognize the responsibility to protect, as applicable to climate change 
humanitarian crises, is a blindness to the environmental realities. In a January 2009 
report on the responsibility to protect, the United Nations secretary-general specifi-
cally excluded the norm from applying to climate change or the response to natural 
disasters.147 The responsibility to protect is an innovative and necessary paradigm-
shifting norm or "quasi-norm" of international law. Existing international law already 
can be interpreted to encompass some natural disasters, environmental destruction, 
and imminent environmental crises within the four atrocity crimes.148 If, however, 
in order to preserve this advance in international law it is necessary, on a practical 
and diplomatic level, to pretend that its applicability to environmental disasters does 
not exist, then that approach is preferable to di.ssent and abandonment of a norm 
whose time has inevitably come. The unavoidable role of the United Nations Security 
Council in humanitarian missions must be seriously reevaluated in the context of 
adaptation to climate disruption. On April 17, 2007, the UN Security Council debated 
whether the potential for global warming to cause wars brought it within the Security 
Council's authority over international peace and security.149 For some time now there 
has been discussion of a global emergency response force for environmental disasters. 
Expertise and resources, and a legal framework, are needed for the Security Council 
to lead in establishing a humanitarian rapid deployment force to address the next 
tsunami, the next Chernobyl, or similar environmental disasters in distressed states, 
with or without state consent.150 The norm that states have a responsibility to protect 
civilian populations when their own state is unwilling or unable to do so has been 
limited to narrowly defined instances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
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crimes against humanity. Whatever remaining debate there might be as to whether 
the cataclysmic weather events mayor may not be attributable to climate change, it 
is indisputable that even highly developed states, such as Japan, turn to the United 
States for assistance in times of crisis. In terms of the rapidly recognized legal norm 
of the responsibility to protect, its purported exclusion of environmental emergencies 
ignores both the legal parameters of the norm as well as the practical realities of the 
responsibility to protect. 
Based on the October 28, 2011, Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change 
Adaptation Task Force, much of the United States' support of international adaptation 
to ensure stability will proceed with foreign aid and cooperative ventures.151 Adapta-
tion is one of the three pillars of the Global Climate Change Initiative of the September 
2010 Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development. As part of the Global Ini-
tiative, the State Department, the U.S.- Agency for International Development, and the 
Treasury Department have provided resources for programs to support other countries 
and communities in adaptation strategies. Other federal agencies, including the Mil-
lennium Challenge Corporation and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, are 
also incorporating climate change considerations into their programs; The multilateral 
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience has leveraged $285 million to assist vulnerable 
developing countries to incorporate climate resilience into their development policies 
and planning. NASA and the U.S. AID's joint venture SERVIR program has provided 
environmental information to support adaptation in developing countries in Central 
America, the Caribbean, East Africa, and the Hindu-Kush Himalayan region of South 
Asia. The State Department, USAID, NOAA, and EPA are assisting the global Adapta-
tion Partnership of more than 20 developed and developing countries in identifying 
adaptation priorities, improving coordination, and increasing financing of adaptation 
measures. The National Security Staff convened technical, international development, 
intelligence, and defense agencies to examine the relevance of climate change to devel-
opment, diplomacy, and defense. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral 
Mullen, released the 2010 National Military Strategy, which (1) notes the importance 
of climate change to the future security environment; (2) discusses conflict preven-
tion in detail; and (3) emphasizes the savings from preventive action. Combatant com-
manders are also authorized to consider climate risks in theater campaign plans and 
cooperate with foreign militaries on environmentally related matters.152 
Conclusion 
There is a misperception that climate change poses a gradually mounting threat to 
national and international security. A more accurate description of the environmental 
risk is climate disruption, which involves sporadic episodes of severe environmental 
destruction in the context of worsening environmental degradation and disruption on 
a more generalized scale, endangering economic, national, international, and human 
security. This reality poses different types of threats to security: immediate nece~si­
ties for humanitarian assistance; gradual destabilization of states and regions and 
adjustment of military resources to deal with these situations; the physical threat to 
military bases, infrastructure, and personnel; and destabilization of physical boundar-
ies and established coalitions. Each of these scenarios necessitates very different adap-
tive responses. With respect to immediate humanitarian assistance and more gradual 
destabilization, there is a necessity for innovative military planning for emergency 
response and more long-term military commitments. Despite the United Nations' 
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refusal to recognize the responsibility to protect as applicable to climate change con-
sequences, refusal to recognize climate change as a trigger of the responsibility to pro-
tect civilian populations ignores the realities of environmental disasters as equivalent 
in harm to serious human rights violations.153 All of these scenarios mandate realloca-
tion of increasingly strained resources and a global reformulation of legal norms and 
resource priorities, particularly for the most developed (and thereby morally, if not 
legally, obligated-to-respond) states. 
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